Too many views have been fathered on Dostoevsky as a result of iso lating certain telling passages and even phrases and treating them as his personal philosophy. The massive importance of Mikhail Bakhtins work on Dostoevsky, available in English since the s, meant that every reader or critic worth his salt was now bound to give weight to the polyphonic" dimension oI Lostoevskythe coexistence oI pro Ioundly diverse voices, making the novel itselI a constant and unnn ished interplay of perspectives: whatever Dostoevsky actually believed himself, he could not but put it into a novel as one perspective among others, since he was committed to a particular view of what author ship can and can't do I shall be looking at this in detail in the third chapter oI this book.
This enIorces a certain caution about any simple readingo Irom the text oI what Lostoevsky thought. But as Bakhtins impact spread and more critical work was devoted to him, the issues around faith in the novels came more directly into focus for many critics. These issues had tended to be the preserve of highly impressionistic, not to say sermonistic, essays in the earlier part oI the century, not least those stemming Irom the Russian emigration Berdyaev's wellknown study, Ior example, or Konstantin Mochulsky's, or Shestov's extraordinary work on Lostoevsky and ietzscheor oI directly theological studies from Protestant or Catholic thinkers.
From the midseventies onward, critical work in English on Dostoevsky became in general far more sophisticated, and part of that welcome development was a new seriousness oI engagement with the religious aspect oI the nction. This was further strengthened, of course, as the critical climate in Russia changed with the weakening and then the downfall of a Soviet regime that had never quite known what to do with Dostoevsky, an unmistakable Russian genius with nearly all the wrong ideas. That is, I have assumed that Dostoevsky is not presenting to us a set of inconclusive arguments about the existence oI Cod," Ior and against, but a nctional picture of what faith and the lack of it would look like in the political and social world oI his dayan assumption articulated clearly by Bakhtin, and also one that shapes some of the most interesting philosophical discussion oI Lostoevsky in recent decades especially the work oI Stewart Sutherland.
Lostoevsky's intention oI writing for the cause of faith need not, of course, limit the readers response or conclusion as to how persuasively this comes over or how consistent its execution Williams Dostoevsky Cont final.
But I have taken it for granted that, to see what he is actually doing, we have to trace so far as possible the inner movement and coher ence I hesitate to use the word logic" oI the way he treats questions about how the liIe oI Iaith is to be imaginedabout the diabolical, about the kind of life that is able to resist the diabolical, about how what we encounter can be understood as a representative or vehicle of the holy.
Perhaps the major point, though, is to do with the issues I have tried to raise about how far we can rightly see the perspective of faith as radically informing both Dostoevskys sense of what it is to write nction at all and his understanding oI the interdependence between human freedom and human language and imagination.
If I read correctly, he is committed to an understanding of both speech and nction that is deeply rooted in a kind oI theology. Acceptable or not to the reader, this is what we need to grasp if we are to read in a way that takes into account his own purposes. This is to raise the question of how far and in what sense we should call Dostoevsky a Christian or indeed an Orthodox novelist.
Such terms are Iraught with problems: they will mean seriously dierent things as used oI dierent writers, and a little clarincation is needed. Quite a lot oI this nction deals with what it is that makes the life of a Catholic distinct from other sorts of lives lived in Britain and elsewhere in the modern age.
Some of it is about how dilemmas arising from the tensions between Catholic teach ing and contemporary mores or personal crises of responsibility divide and even destroy individuals. Some of it is about how the teaching of the Catholic Church, dicult and apparently unreasonable as it seems, is obscurely vindicated as the hand of God works through chaotic human interactions.
Some of it challenges us by refusing any such resolution and leaving us dealing us with the Iorce oI the conBicts generated. But this is not the only way in which we can speak of Catholic novelists. It is rather about the possibility of any morally coherent life in a culture of banal ity and selIdeceit. Their protagonists may or may not be Catholics by profession, but their narratives are those of people who encounter the eects oI this banality or proIanity or absurdity and are questioned by itnot in a way that necessarily leads them to proIess orthodox Cath olic faith, but in a way that leaves the assumptions prevailing in their environment under some kind of challenge.
Their mode is essentially comic not to say grotesque, in the sense that the persons oI the nc tion are caught in incongruities they do not themselves see or under stand. The ambiguity oI his nction lies in this simulta neous recognition that violence is the ultimate distraction for the lost self and that the violence of social, moral or mental collapse is the only tool that can break into the strongholds of the modern self.
Spark and Ellis create characters whose comprehensive ironizing of their situa tions and relationships places the entire narrative within a framework oI a kind oI alienation, they have also played eectively with dierent strategies of fragmentation in narrative point of view, which has a simi lar eect. All Iour create a world in which the secular majority account of what is going on is severely relativized, but there is no simple alter native that anyone can step into by a single decision or even a series of decisions.
The religious" dimension oI these nctions lies in the insis tent sense oI incongruity, unmistakable even iI no one within the nc tion can say quite what we should be congruent with. These are narratives that could be written in sub stantial part by someone who was, as a matter of fact, not a Catholic but sensitively equipped to understand the tragedy of a person caught in these tensions. The second kind could only be written by someone whose concern was to provide a structured narrative space a notion I'll elaborate later in this book in which tensions were created Ior the reader rather than the charactersthat is, in which we are invited not to contemplate the dilemmas of an individual which may or may not mirror our own, but to inhabit a narrative world whose center of gravity is hidden as it is in all daily experience, but whose distinctive boundaries are capable oI being sensed obliquely yet nrmly.
Lostoevsky is obviously closer to the second than to the nrst cat egory. He has no interest at all in the dilemmas of the Orthodox Chris tian as distinct from other people; for one thing, practically everyone in his world is at least nominally Orthodox anyway. Nor is he inter ested in depicting Orthodoxy. It was a gap in his writing that dismayed some pious readers in his liIetime and later, you will not nnd in him the aectionate sketches oI Orthodox ecclesial liIe that characterize Leskovs work, or even the nostalgic vignettes scattered through the nction oI Tolstoy and Chekhov.
The general environment is one in which, when Christian practice is mentioned, it is obviously Ortho dox, and the scene setting in the monasteries is clear and credible. But anyone looking in the novels for any hint of exotic ritual, for mysti cism" or mystique, will be disappointed.
Yetand this will be argued in more detail laterthe background against which his characters move and develop is extensively and deeply shaped by motifs in Orthodox Christianity. Like our second group of Catholic writers, he locates his narrative within an implied order.
The presence of order is visible, in verbal argument and in the lives oI certain iconic" characters see chap. The readers work remains to be done in this regard. The tension between presence and eective authority will be a theme that recurs in dierent ways quite regularly as we reBect on the novels. And it may help us understand better why the question of the existence oI Cod" is not really at the heart oI Lostoevsky's labors. In a passage that has been much cited to illustrate the indeterminacy oI Lostoevsky's real" Ieelings about Iaith, Alyosha Karamazov admits to Lise Khokhlakova z8j, It is possible that I do not even believe in Cod.
But the context of his remark is important: he has been speaking oI the selIdestructive strain in the Karamazov character that is leading his father and brothers to disaster; and he adds that in addition to all that" his elder is dying, the nnest man in all the world, he is Iorsaking the earth" z8j.
The latter comment is particularly signincant, as it echoes the protests oI Ippolit in The Idiot and Kirillov in Devils that the laws oI nature and thus oI death did not spare the greatest human being of all. And Alyoshas crisis of faith comes to a head when the operation of the laws of nature becomes all too obvious as the elders body begins to decay after death.
The crisis is not so much, then, about whether God exists, but about what the nature is of Gods relation with the world, and most of all with the human world. Alyoshas problem is in fact very close indeed to Ivan'snot in admitting the existence oI Cod, but in the possibility of accepting God and the world and the problem of what sort of life such acceptance would entail. Alyoshas uncertainty about whether he believes in Cod" is an uncertainty about whether the liIe he leads and the feelings he has are the life and the feelings that would rightly fol low from belief in God.
He knows the dierence between selIdestructive activity and the liIe oI genuine belieI as he sees it in the elder, but he cannot truthIully say that he is yet committed unreservedly to the latter. He is in the monastery partly because of a revolt against other options, partly because belief in God and immortality has simply taken hold of his imagination and he cannot believe that anything less than visibly wholehearted commitment in the form of the monastic life can rightly and credibly express this faith.
But Aly osha said to himselI: 'I cannot give up two roubles instead oI all"' " o. But the decisive Iactor is meeting Father Zosima, and Alyosha is convinced that the elder possesses a secret" that can renew the world ,. However, he is also at this stage still wedded to an idea oI what this might mean that is bound up with how the elder will bring glory" to the monastery: he envisages Zosima, in other words, as the Iocus oI a great and inspiring cultus.
So it is entirely in character that he should be anxious about the genuineness of his faith at a point when he is deeply aware of his kin ship with his familys destructive heritage, recognizing that he is not innocent" z86, and when he is suering Irom the prospect oI the elder's imminent deatha point at which he is also nnalizing his aban donment of monastic life through his engagement to Lise.
He has to undergo a set oI purgatorial trials so as to arrive at a dierent kind oI faith. The elders death and decay forces him to abandon the idea of a triumphalist cult oI Zosima as sage and wonderworker, the encounter with Grushenka shows him that God can be at work in the least act of generosity Irom a Bawed and sinIul person, the vision oI Cana oI Cali lee" which overtakes him as he dozes by the elder's con declares that Williams Dostoevsky Cont final.
God will value and work with the least sign of movement toward him. Alyosha has sensed a divine abundance and liberty that exceeds human standards oI success and Iailure, his belieI has been transIormedbut not in the sense that he has become convinced of Gods existence. It is rather that he now sees clearly what might be involved in a life that would merit being called a life of faith.
For Lostoevsky, the true synthesis," writes Stewart Sutherland, the nnal reply oI belieI or unbelieI, can only come in a statement that conIorms to the demands oI art and reality.
But to some extent, Dostoevsky knows what he is about, knows what kind of failure he has condemned himself to. What he does in Karamazov is not to demonstrate that it is possible to imagine a life so integrated and transparent that the credibility of faith becomes unassailable; it is simply to show that faith moves and adapts, matures and reshapes itselI, not by adjusting its doctrinal content the error oI theological liberalism, with which Lostoevsky had no patience but by the relent less stripping away from faith of egotistical or triumphalistic expecta tions.
The credibility of faith is in its freedom to let itself be judged and to grow. In the nature of the case, there will be no unanswerable dem onstrations and no nnal unimprovable biographical Iorm apart Irom Christ, who can only be and is only represented in nction through the oblique reBection oI his Iace in those who are moving toward him. And the question will never be resolved as to whether faiths capacity to survive disillusion and apparent Iailure Zosima's body decaying is a mark oI the power oI resourceIul selIdeceit or the power oI truthIul Williams Dostoevsky Cont final.
A good novel will not pretend to answer this; a novel written for the sake of the credibility of Orthodox Christianity can only set out the necessarily incomplete narrative and invite the reader Ireely to indwell it and discover whatever is to be discovered. There will be a fair amount of discussion in later pages about free dom.
Some of it has to do with Dostoevskys actual depiction of vari eties of freedom in the personages of the novels, and particularly the terriIying pronles oI revolutionary" Ireedom sketched in Devils. Here we have a diagnosis of the pathology of fantasies of absolute freedom comparable indeed quite closely comparable to Hegel's in the Phe nomenology: the Ireedom oI the void" is the dream oI a liberty com pletely without constraint from any other, human, subhuman or divine; because it has no other," it can also have no content.
But this means that the hunger for such freedom can only manifest itself in destruc tion, Binging itselI against existing limits, and when those limits are destroyed, it has to look around Ior more others" to annihilate, culmi nating in selIdestruction. Since limits make us what we are, the idea oI absolute Ireedom is bound to be terroristic," says Terry Lagleton in an exceptionally penetrating essay on the political pathologies of the contemporary West. As we shall see, it is cru cial to his understanding of what he is doing that he sees language itself as the indisputable marker of freedom: confronted with what seeks to close down exchange or conBict, we discover we can always say more.
This is emphatically and evidently a liberty that depends on otherness. It is generated by what is other to the mind or self or will; it is through response toincluding contradiction oIwhat is given that we develop as subjects. And this means, of course, that when we have nothing with which to engage, we stop speaking and stop developing. It is in one sense true that we can say what we like; in another sense, manifestly not true, since we are performing linguis tically within a world in which we have to make ourselves recogniz able to other speakers, as they are to us.
Some of Dostoevskys most intriguing and teasing Iugues oI obsessive reBectionas in Notes from the Undergroundexplore the balance between the liberty to say what we like, protesting about the reduction of language to mathematical Williams Dostoevsky Cont final. Our problemiI we believe thisis how to live so as to allow that resonance to shape what we say and do. And if we do not accept such a premise, we shall need to work rather hard, so Dostoevsky assures us, to explain why this does not leave us with the destructive vacuity oI absolute" Ireedom, with the void.
And this means the death of language: either the malign silence oI apathy and the absence oI desire you've lost your eloquence completely" says Lizaveta to Stavroginor, now you've Iallen silent," as another translation has it aIter they have Iailed to consummate the romance they both vainly hoped Ior ,8 or the stream oI empty words that seek nothing except poweroI which the demonic chatter of Pyotr Verkhovensky is Dostoevskys most chilling example.
It does this by insist ing on Ireedomthe Ireedom oI characters within the novel to go on answering each other, even when this wholly upsets and disappoints any hopes we may have for resolutions and good endings, and therefore also the freedom of the reader to reply, having digested this text in the continuing process oI a reBective liIe.
It enacts the Ireedom it discusses by creating a narrative space in which various futures are possible for characters and Ior readers. And in doing so it seeksin the author's intentionto represent the ways in which the world's creator exercises authorship," generates dependence without control.
The twist in the apologetic is that it is precisely the possibility of refusing to acknowl edge that representation, or to acknowledge that something real is being represented, that constitutes it as a veridical representation. The nction is like the world itselIproposed Ior acceptance and under standing but unable to compel them, since compulsion would make it impossible for the creator to appear as the creator of freedom.
All this is a fairly long journey from the deceptively straightfor ward question of whether Dostoevsky is a Christian or Orthodox nov elist, but the exploration of these issues about belief, unbelief, and Williams Dostoevsky Cont final.
The extent to which, similarly, he can only be the kind of Orthodox novelist he is in virtue oI certain narrative strategies is less clearcut, and debate on this is unlikely to ease o in the Ioreseeable Iuture. My judgment overall is that Dostoevskys distinctively Orthodox frame of reference, especially in regard to this last point about the understanding oI images, is a deeply signincant element in the con struction oI his nctional worldnot simply at the level oI stagesetting, as if we were to imagine onion domes painted on a backdrop, but at the level oI basic theological perspectives on creation and incarnation and also in regard to what he understood by the Church.
His opposi tion to Roman Catholicism is oIten as intemperate as it is illinIormed, but he is consciously drawing on a peculiarly nineteenthcentury Rus sian Orthodox set oI polemical concerns, going back to midcentury religious philosophers and essayists like Kireevsky and Khomyakov, and echoed in the early work of his friend Solovyov.
Roman Catholicism was one of those subjects on which Dos toevsky could be spectacularly pigheaded, and the claim I have just ascribed to him is not to be taken too seriously in just those terms. What matters is that we see his thoughts about liberty and what we have learned Irom Bakhtin to call polyphony" to have been bound up in a general sense oI what was dierent about Orthodoxy, a sense which he shared with some of the most innovative Orthodox minds in his milieu.
It was neither a mark of Westernizing liberalism, as some charged it with being, nor simplyat the other extremea reBection of Slavophil romanticism about the communal vision of Old Russia. It was part of what linked him with the monastery at Optina and the thinking that had developed there and among some of the literary and intellectual friends of the monks. Certainly for him the Russianness of this vision was a matter of obsessive conviction, underpinning his ambitious claims for the Russian people as the only nation with a genu inely universal mission.
In these pages, we shall be trying to discern something of these foundations. At the beginning of this introduction, I summed up the central question posed by the various moral crises to which Dostoevsky was seeking to respond as What is it that human beings owe to each other:" The incapacity to answer that question coherentlyor indeed to recognize that it is a question at allwas Ior Lostoevsky more than just a regrettable lack of philosophical rigor; it was an opening to the demonicthat is, to the prospect oI the end oI history, imagination, and speech, the dissolution of human identity.
The question does not seem any less pressing in the new century, and the incapacity or unwill ingness to answer it is even more in evidence. II Lostoevsky's nctions still arrest the reader with their diagnosis of the most acute human cri ses, as they unquestionably do, it will not be a waste of time to clarify some oI the vision out oI which he workedwhether or not our labors in dealing with these crises nnally bring us where he wants us to be.
He describes himselI as a child oI unbelieI and doubt" and says that he expects to remain so until his death; he speaks of the burning desire to believe and its cost to him; and, perhaps most famously, he claims that if someone were to prove to me that Christ was outside the truth, and it was really the case that the truth lay outside Christ, then I should choose to stay with Christ rather than with the truth. Like Milton, he is of the Devils party without knowing it, or at any rate without honestly acknowledging it, and his professions of faith are at best poignant testimony to his nostalgia for impossible certainty, a nostalgia expressed by a bare irrational insistence on his choice to believe.
A more sympathetic reading would link it to the whole intellec tual drift, from the late eighteenth to the twentieth century, toward a distinction between objective and subjective in religious language, between the deliverances oI historical inquiry and the selIcommitment of faith.
Dostoevsky is here seen as part of the story that begins with Lessing's ugly ditch" between history and the utterances oI Iaith, that proceeds by way of Kierkegaards analysis of faith as subjectivity, and that nnds diverse twentiethcentury expression in RudolI Bultmann's Christian existentialism 3 and, most radically, Don Cupitts antirealist theological programme.
The conIession oI Iaith is just that: a risky selI projection in the face of a void or a world of manifest meaninglessness, Iaith and not justinable assertion.
It is in one sense or another something created by human freedom. Dostoevsky becomes the ally of a particular kind oI religious modernity in which an aesthetic oI selIdennition through the option to entertain a religious mythology replaces any residual metaphysic, any suggestion that religious utterances purport to tell the truth about the universe.
But I want to suggest that this is a hasty and inadequate reading, which nnally leads to a seriously mistaken under standing of many other aspects of Dostoevskys work. That this is so becomes apparent when we pick up some of the echoes of the Fonvizina letter elsewhere in his writing, and also when we think through more carefully the actual phraseology of the letter; it is also worth bearing in mind that Dostoevsky wrote these words at a point when he was a good way from the beliefs of his literary maturity, and was still attempting to come to terms with the enormous mental and imaginative upheav als oI his prison experience.
In prison, he hadso he later claimed in A Writers Diaryreceived Christ into his soul in a new way, because oI his contact with the faith of the ordinary Russians around him. He seems to have made his Communion on occasions in Siberia during his imprisonment, and even at the time of his most direct involvement Williams Dostoevsky Cont final. Yet the letter undoubtedly represents signincant strands in his thinking and cannot be written o as a passing aberra tion. Fortunately we have a good deal of evidence that he himself in later years wanted to make better sense of these ideas, and we shall be examining four places in his later work where they seem to be in his mind and where his reworking oI the themes oers some critically important interpretative light.
First, in , there is the whole discussion in Notes from the Under ground of the arbitrary element in the human mind. The Underground Man," the tormented, savage, ironical and absurd nrst person oI this text, directs some of his most concentrated venom at a philosophy oI rational selIinterest.
The rightminded liberal world oI his time assumes that when human beings are authoritatively shown what is good for them, they will want it and choose it; but the fact is that human beings are not so constructed. Demonstrate that two plus two is four, and there will be someone who will simply assert that it is not so. People will not readily accept any wouldbe dennitive account oI what is in their interest.
A man can consciously and purposely desire Ior himselI what is positively harmIul and stupid," and will insist on the right to want it 6. In other words, part of the distinctively human is the capacity for perversity, addiction, selIsacrince, selIdestruction and a whole range oI rationally" indeIensible behaviors. Remove this capacity and two Williams Dostoevsky Cont final. Losto evsky's nerce polemic against Mikhail SaltykovShchedrin in 86 and 9 brings out this theme very starkly: if human beings turn out to desire what they ought not to, the only solution for the consistent rationalist is the removal of whatever part of them is involved in the desiring.
II someone wants to dance, cut o his legs. But, Lostoevsky insists, the freedom to refuse what is claimed to be rational is part of an integral or complete account of human existence; its denial is thus an act of violence, even if it is done in the name of peace or welfare. Many later pages of Dostoevsky cast their shadow before them here.
But the specinc context is signincant. The thereness" oI the world and its processes, whether of mathematical calculation or physical reg ularity, does not yield any meaning that would make possible a rec onciled" liIe, an intelligent acceptance oI things as part oI a coherent moral policy.
The givenness of the world is felt, says the Underground Man, as a stone wall" z, inviting eorts to break through it and caus ing all the more pain as those eorts are renewed and Iail. And in that process of hurling the mind and soul against the unyielding surface of things, the frustrated self increasingly takes the blame for the situa tion: it is inner weakness that makes the wall impenetrableas iI, by sheer force of will, it might be possible to break through into a world where two and two did not make four.
If all there is really to know is that two and two make four, there is nothing left to do, much less to learn". If only we could really be convinced of that, these deeper desires could be Williams Dostoevsky Cont final. Englands smukkeste haver pdf download Helena Attlee.
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In order to respond to such a challenge the novels invite us to imagine precisely those extremes of failure, suffering and desolation. Dostoevsky language, faith, and fiction Book, Get this from a library! Dostoevsky language, faith, and fiction. Williams investigation
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